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REDEFINING THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS IN





In several recent and important co-authored articles, Margaret
Blair and Lynn Stout have set forth and elaborated upon an intriguing
"team production model" (henceforth "TPM") of corporate govern-
ance.' These articles advance two bold claims. First, the authors
make the descriptive claim that the courts now embrace the TPM as
the paradigmatic governance framework for public corporations more
than they do the competing agency model and its associated norm of
shareholder primacy. 2 Second, the authors applaud this development,
contending that the TPM better reflects the reality of modern public
corporate governance arrangements than does the conventional
agency model, and thus provides a superior normative paradigm for
guiding corporate law.3
Their original 1999 TPM article has subsequently received consid-
erable scholarly attention,4 some of it laudatory, 5 some of a more
t Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University. J.D.
1985, Yale Law School.
1. See, eg., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (reprinted in 24 J. CORP. L. 751 (1999)) [here-
inafter "Blair and Stout I']; Margaret M. Blair and Lynn Stout, Corporate Accountabil-
ity: Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 403 (2001) [hereinafter "Blair and Stout II"]; Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout,
Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Norms of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1735 (2001) [hereinafter "Blair and Stout III"]. See also Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A.
Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743
(1999). The authors explicitly recognize that their TPM approach is grounded in a sub-
stantial body of prior economic literature, in particular, Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. EcON. L.
REV. 777 (1972); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
Sci. 324 (1982); and Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in the Theory of the
Firm, 113 Q. J. ECON. 387 (1998). See Blair and Stout II, 79 WAsH. U. L.Q. at 419 n.34.
2. See Blair and Stout I, 85 VA. L. REV. at 287-89.
3. Id. at 289.
4. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Team Production in Business Organizations: Mea-
suring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable are U.S. Public Corpora-
tions?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837 (1999); David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A
Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2000);
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mixed character,6 and some critical of both its descriptive and norma-
tive claims. 7 I am not aware of any judicial opinions that have yet
Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEo. L.J. 439 (2001); Peter Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate
Law Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667 (2002); Alan J. Meese, The Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Kostant, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. at 672-74, which states:
The TPM... provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding corpo-
rate governance... [and] provides a new and more inclusive paradigm of corpo-
rate governance in which stakeholder voice and loyalty are crucial. Applying
TPM can help to introduce more meaningful "governance" into corporate gov-
ernance and to provide some of the benefits commonly resulting from a political
system.
Kostant, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REV. at 672-74.
6. See, e.g., Coates, 24 J. CoaP. L. at 838 who states:
The [Blair and Stout TPM] model returns to an important topic-the potential
importance of firm-specific capital in explaining organizational structure ....
For those who view income and wealth disparities in the U.S. with dismay, the
TPM/MH is also appealing from a distributional perspective, suggesting that
boards distribute more to employees and less to the relatively wealthy segment
of Americans that own stock.
Id. However, Coates later expresses strong reservations about the scope of applicability
of the TPM as a normative framework. "[In the vast majority of close corporations and
a significant minority of public corporations... [the TPM] does not have facial plausibil-ity ... the ability of the TPM/MH to rationalize corporate law may be considerably more
limited than might first appear." Id. at 864-65. See also Viet D. Dinh, Codetermination
and Corporate Governance in a Multinational Business Enterprise, 24 J. CORP. L. 975,
990-91 (1999) which states: "[While the TPM] seems to offer more fresh insights and a
better understanding of economic functions ... the theory places too much emphasis onjudicial competence to enforce those duties ... a structural shortcoming in their theory."
7. See, e.g., Millon, 86 VA. L. REV. at 1001. Millon makes clear that he regards the
shareholder primacy norm as having much greater sway in corporate law than Blair
and Stout recognize in their original TPM article, and that their claim that the TPM
model accurately describes current governance arrangements in public corporations is
at least overstated if not flatly incorrect. See id. at 1009-24 (close look at their analysis
suggests that, at best, TPM's claim of descriptive validity is overstated). In addition, he
criticizes the TPM as a normative paradigm on several bases. First, he argues that
rather than solving in an efficient fashion the rent-seeking problem that participants
in a corporate enterprise must address in dividing the economic rents of the enterprise
ex post when they have not agreed ex ante to a division, it likely just channels those
unproductive efforts into attempts by each class of claimants to influence the board of
directors to favor them in the allocation. See id. at 1031. He notes that this may actu-
ally lead to more inefficient rent-seeking than would occur when the board of directors
embraces a shareholder primacy norm and therefore other classes of claimants concede
defeat and spare their efforts. Id.
Second, Millon argues that the appeal of the TPM for communitarian corporate schol-
ars who generally favor policies which would alter the current distribution of gains from
corporate enterprises away from shareholders and in favor of other claimants such as
workers is greatly reduced by the fact that under that approach, the allocation of eco-
nomic rents would likely depend solely upon the the relative balance of "political" power
among the different groups of claimants. See id. at 1037-38. Since the TPM does noth-
ing to alter the current relative bargaining power of shareholders vis-a-vis workers,
local communities, etc., he concludes that it will not alter the relative distribution of
rewards among these groups, and is therefore from the communitarian perspective
merely a sophisticated justification for the staus quo. See id. at 1038. Mullin concludes
by stating: that "[diespite the apparent appeal of its rejection of shareholder primacy,
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drawn upon this growing TPM literature to change or clarify the legal
standards applicable to corporate governance disputes. However, the
TPM concept is unusual in that it to some extent bridges the wide
chasm between the mainstream "contractarian" and the competing
"communitarian"s views of corporation law9 that has now persisted for
decades. 10 Adherents of these two competing analytical frameworks
usually start from radically different normative premises" and ad-
vance sharply conflicting policy recommendations, particularly with
regard to the roles that non-shareholder corporate stakeholders such
TPM therefore does little to advance a progressive agenda for corporate law." Id. at
1044.
Blair and Stout II was written after Millon's comprehensive and perceptive critique
was published, and the article is somewhat disappointing in that it does not attempt to
squarely address his criticisms, either through direct rebuttal or through making suita-
ble concessions or qualifications, but merely notes his article in a couple of brief footnote
references without joining the issues he raises. See Blair and Stout II, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
at 428-29 n.71, 435 n.94. See also Meese, 43 Wm. & MARY L. REV. at 1646, 1664, 1671
(describing Blair and Stout's TPM as "a quintessential application ... of the Nirvana
Fallacy") (Meese argues that under the TPM model directors lack the incentive to maxi-
mize the welfare of the other team participants and restrain opportunism, and the
framework thereby creates additional "ownership costs" of a monitoring nature which
would offset any efficiency advantages that might result); see also Hansmann & Kraak-
man, 89 GEO. L.J. at 447 (referring to Blair and Stout as "sophisticated American advo-
cates of the fiduciary model"). Despite this reference, Hansmann and Kraakman offer
the following critical assessment of the TPM approach:
There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value .. . [The Blair and
Stout TPM does not] consitute at bottom a new approach to the corporation...
Stakeholder models of the [Blair and Stout TPM] fiduciary type are in effect
just reformulations of the [now rejected older] manager-oriented model, and
they suffer the same weaknesses. While untethered managers may better
serve the interests of some classes of stakeholders, such as a firm's existing
employees and creditors, the managers' own interests will often come to have
disproportionate prominence in their decisionmaking, with costs to some inter-
est groups-such as shareholders, customers, and potential new employees and
creditors-that outweigh any gains to the stakeholders who benefit. Moreo-
ver,the courts are evidently incapable of formulating and enforcing fiduciary
duties of sufficient refinement to ensure that manager behave more efficiently
and fairly.
Id. at 439, 448. (emphasis in original).
8. The "communitarian" view is sometimes labled the "progressive" view of corpo-
rate law.
9. Blair and Stout emphasize this point in their original article. Blair and Stout I,
85 VA. L. REV. at 253-54. For a good general discussion contrasting the contractarian
and communitarian perspectives on corporate law, see David Millon, New Directions in
Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993).
10. "The war between the contractarians and the anticontractarians has raged for
two decades and produced a voluminous literature." Blair and Stout III, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. at 1782.
11. See Millon, 86 VA. L. REV. at 1040-42.
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as employees and members of the "local communities"' 2 in which the
corporations are situated should play in corporate governance. The
possibility that those two groups of corporate law scholars who rarely
agree with one another may each find some merit in the TPM concept,
both as a descriptive schema and as a normative standard, suggests
that Blair and Stout may have developed a flexible yet useful new
framework that will eventually influence thinking beyond the acad-
emy and impact judicial decisions in a positive way.' 3
While the TPM concept has some shortcomings and is not yet
fully articulated, in my opinion it nevertheless has substantial merit
as an alternative description of public corporation governance and as
a yardstick for the assessment of corporation law as applied to those
entities. It definitely provides an interesting contrast to the more con-
ventional agency model of corporate governance and its associated
shareholder primacy norm, as well as to the communitarian perspec-
tive on corporate governance. It therefore would be a worthwhile ex-
ercise on the part of corporate law scholars to add to the recent work
done by John Coates,' 4 Viet Dinh, 15 Henry Hansmann, 16 Reiner
Kraakman, 17 Peter Kostant,' 8 Alan Meese, 19 David Millon 20 and
others, and more fully elaborate the theoretical and practical implica-
tions of the TPM and subject them to discussion and criticism. In this
article, I will attempt to make a modest contribution to that effort by
examining the implications of the TPM for the locus and definition of
the fiduciary duties that should be imposed upon the boards of direc-
tors of public corporations and by considering how effective a fiduciary
duty regime that is tailored to fit TPM-style governance of public cor-
porations is likely to be in achieving desirable social objectives.
As noted above, the TPM contrasts sharply with the conventional
agency model of corporate governance and with the corollary principle
that the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers should run
solely to the corporation's residual claimant common shareholders.2 1
The growing body of TPM literature, however, has so far failed to
12. By this term I intend to refer broadly to the corporation's customers and suppli-
ers as well as those persons who reside in proximity to the corporation's facilities or are
otherwise indirectly affected by its operations.
13. See Millon, 86 Va. L. Rev. at 1001 (questioning whether the TPM will ulti-
mately hold any appeal for communitarian scholars).
14. Coates, 24 J. CORP. L. at 837.
15. Dinh, 24 J. CORP. L. at 975.
16. Hansmann & Kraakman, 89 GEO. L.J. at 439.
17. Id.
18. Kostant, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. at 667.
19. Meese, 43 Wm. & MARY L. REV. at 1629.
20. Millon, 86 VA. L. REV. at 1001.
21. See Blair and Stout I, 85 VA. L. REV. at 253-55; But see Gregory Scott Crespi,
Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Duties: The Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy
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make entirely clear whether under the TPM framework these tradi-
tional agency model-based fiduciary duties in favor of shareholders
should be 1) preserved as a means of limiting director discretion, but
augmented by the imposition of additional fiduciary duties to other
stakeholders; 2) retained as the sole fiduciary duties, but respecified
to run in favor of a larger class of stakeholders; or 3) discarded alto-
gether, with other legal and/or non-legal means instead relied upon to
constrain director discretion.
To briefly summarize my conclusions, if fiduciary duty law as ap-
plied to the directors of public corporations is to be redesigned to bet-
ter facilitate TPM-style corporate governance arrangements, as I
discuss below I would favor the respecification of those duties along
the lines of the second alternative above. The proliferation of poten-
tially conflicting fiduciary duties called for by the first alternative
above would create a severe "too many masters" problem 2 2 that would
not arise under the second or third alternatives. However, the second
alternative above-preserving the concept of exclusive fiduciary du-
ties and simply respecifying their locus as being the corporate entity
as a whole, very broadly defined to include all de jure and de facto
stakeholders-is more in accord with the basic TPM concept than is
the more radical third alternative. 23 In addition, as a practical matter
the courts tend to favor incremental over more radical changes and
are far more likely to seriously consider embracing the new TPM para-
digm if it is presented to them as a rationale for reorienting the appli-
cation of traditional fiduciary duty principles than if it requires them
to completely discard those principles.
In this article, I will in Part II present a very brief overview of the
major TPM concepts. 2 4 In Part III, I will initially discuss how the lo-
cus of fiduciary duties should be respecified to be consistent with the
Norm, 55 SMU L. REV. 141 (2002) (arguing that even under the agency model a con-
tractarian analysis does not support the shareholder primacy norm).
22. See Millon, 86 VA. L. REV. at 1001.
23. While Blair and Stout in their original article do not make entirely clear what
role fiduciary duties would play under the TPM, they do suggest that those duties
should remain in place and run to the corporate entity as a whole. See Blair and Stout I,
85 VA. L. REV. at 271. ("[The mediating hierarch's] primary function is to exercise that
control in a fashion that maximizes the" joint welfare of the team as a whole.). In their
second article, however, they appear to more explicitly endorse the concept of a unitary
fiduciary duty running to the corporate enterprise as a whole. See Blair and Stout II, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. at 421-25. ("[The mediating hierarch's allocation decisions should be
made] with an eye to maximizing the total surplus .... The board of directors [under
the TPM] acts as a fiduciary of the firm, meaning that it seeks to maximize the total
value of these combined interests" of the shareholder, bondholder, manager and
employees.).
24. A reader interested in a more complete explanation of the TPM should read the
series of Blair and Stout articles on the subject, supra note 1, as well as David Millon's
and Alan Meese's comprehensive critiques of the TPM approach, supra note 4.
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TPM framework of corporate governance, should that paradigm be de-
termined to be a descriptively more accurate model of public corpora-
tions than is the conventional agency model. I will then review the
relatively complex calculations that would have to be carried out to
determine how the performance of a TPM-style corporate board of di-
rectors measures up against these respecified fiduciary duties. Fi-
nally, I will discuss what practical significance of embracing the TPM
by the courts as well as their subsequent respecification of the fiduci-
ary duty standards to be consistent with this model, would have for
corporate governance. Part IV will present a brief conclusion.
This article will address only the fiduciary duty law implications
that should follow from judicial acceptance of the TPM as the domi-
nant governance paradigm for public corporations. There are of
course several other substantial and interesting questions presented
by the TPM that also merit extended consideration. For example,
Blair and Stout's strong descriptive claim that corporate governance
law already is more in accord with the TPM than with the agency
model of corporate governance is open to serious question. 25
As another example, their claim that the TPM governance struc-
ture generally solves the public corporation stakeholder contracting
problems that they identify more efficiently than would a governance
structure that charged the board of directors to act as agents of the
common shareholder principals leaves considerable room for debate,
as does the claim that a contractarian hypothetical bargain analysis
therefore calls for the TPM to be utilized as the normative baseline for
assessing the facilitative properties of corporate governance law.2 6 Fi-
nally, it is unclear whether legal rules designed to facilitate TPM-style
corporate governance arrangements will actually work to further
traditional communitarian objectives such as enhanced rights for
workers and local communities more than does the the agency model-
based shareholder primacy norm. 27 These interesting questions, how-
ever, are beyond the scope of this article.
II. THE TEAM PRODUCTION MODEL OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Blair and Stout base the TPM on a rejection of the conventional
contractarian agency model of corporate governance under which cor-
porate directors and officers are regarded as agents of their share-
25. See, e.g., Millon, 86 VA. L. REV. at 1020-21; Meese, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. at
1672-1700.
26. Id. at 1030-32, 1701-02.
27. See, e.g., Millon, 86 VA. L. REV. at 1038-39.
[Vol. 36
2003] FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 629
holder principals. 28 They contend that the agency model does not fit
most public corporations very well because their shareholders retain
too little effective control over corporate officials to be meaningfully
regarded as their principals. 29 They argue that the true objective of
corporate governance arrangements is not the minimization of agency
costs, as is widely thought, but is instead an efficient solution of the
team production problem. 3
0
This problem arises because the different stakeholders in a public
corporation each must invest "firm-specific"3 1 resources in the enter-
prise as part of the effort to jointly produce firm output, and are conse-
quently vulnerable after making these relatively illiquid investments
to opportunistic behavior on the part of the other stakeholders. The
central contracting problem they face is how to efficiently allocate the
gains from the production and sale of that output among themselves
when the output is by its nature joint production drawing upon all of
their contributions, and where there is an "economic rent" surplus re-
maining for distribution in some fashion after each class of stakehold-
ers has been compensated for their investment of capital or labor in
accordance with their opportunity costs.3 2 Blair and Stout contend
that the stakeholders of large public corporations are generally unable
to contract ex ante at a reasonable transaction cost for a division of
that economic rent in a manner that effectively precludes all forms of
shirking.3 3 Moreover, if they attempt to address the shirking problem
in isolation by according one class of stakeholders, such as, for exam-
ple, the common shareholders, the right to retain all of the economic
rent after the other stakeholders have been compensated in accor-
dance with their opportunity costs, then that class as the sole residual
claimants will have the proper incentive to act as ex post monitors to
prevent shirking by the other stakeholders. However, the other stake-
holders will then have inadequate incentives to make efficient levels
of firm-specific investments since their opportunity cost-based com-
pensation will not reflect the full value of their firm-specific invest-
ments to the corporate entity. The overall wealth of the corporate
28. Blair and Stout I, 85 VA. L. REV. at 253-55.
29. Id. at 258-59.
30. Id. at 249-51.
31. Blair and Stout define "firm-specific" investments as investments that are diffi-
cult or impossible for the contributors "to recover once committed to the [corporate en-
terprise]." Id. at 249.
32. These opportunity costs would be determined by what the contributors could
earn by withdrawing their resources from the corporate enterprise, being able to recap-
ture only at most a portion of their firm-specific investments, and then devoting those
resources to their best alternative use.
33. Blair and Stout I, 85 VA. L. REV. at 265-66.
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entity as a whole will therefore be reduced by this underinvestment,
perhaps substantially so. 34
Barnes and Stout argue that the most cost-effective strategy for
the participants in the corporate enterprise to deal simultaneously
with these two sources of inefficiency is to relinquish control of the
enterprise to an independent third party-the board of directors. It is
then the board's duty to further the interests of the entire enterprise
and allocate the rewards of production among the investing stakehold-
ers in a manner that 1) assures the continuing participation of each
group by compensating them for at least the opportunity costs of their
investment; 2) effectively controls shirking with ex post monitoring;
and 3) allocates the economic rent in a manner which reflects the po-
litical balance of power among these groups within the overall enter-
prise and which preserves the proper incentives to encourage efficient
levels of firm-specific investment. 35
The board of directors under the TPM is thus best characterized
as a "mediating hierarch"36 rather than as an agent of the sharehold-
ers. The board is conceded authority by the various stakeholders be-
cause by doing so they can avoid both the transaction costs they would
otherwise incur in negotiating ex ante the much more fully specified
contracts that would otherwise be necessary to protect themselves
from shirking by others, and the losses that would result from the re-
duced incentives to commit firm-specific resources that would result
from assigning one class of claimants the exclusive rights to the sur-
plus and limiting all other stakeholders' compensations to their oppor-
tunity costs. Under the TPM, the power that the stakeholders confer
upon the board of directors to favor one group of corporate claimants
over others is virtually absolute as long as their decisions are in the
long-term interest of the overall enterprise, and as long as the board
of directors evidence loyalty to the overall enterprise and refrain from
self-dealing at its expense. 37
The TPM is a particularly interesting framework to use as a nor-
mative paradigm for the assessment of corporate governance law. Its
main features are grounded in a conventional contractarian assess-
ment of the hypothetical bargain that public corporation stakeholders
would reach in costless ex ante negotiations in an attempt to simulta-
neously minimize the costs of limiting shirking, the costs of reduced
output resulting from the provision of inadequate incentives to bring
34. Id. at 272-73.
35. Id. at 282-83.
36. Id. at 250.
37. Good summaries of the Blair and Stout TPM framework are provided by Kos-
tant, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. at 672-74; Meese, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1629-45; and
Millon, 86 VA. L. REV. at 1005-09.
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forth efficient levels of firm-specific investment, and the costs of di-
viding up the economic rents. Blair and Stout conclude, however, that
such bargaining would not lead to acceptance of the conventional con-
tractarian shareholder primacy legal norm and the corollary principle
that fiduciary duties should run exclusively to the common sharehold-
ers, but would instead result in the board being given the authority to
favor other stakeholders over the common shareholders if the
long-term interests of the entire enterprise were thereby advanced.
In other words, the TPM framework interestingly provides a con-
tractarian, efficiency-oriented justification for legal rules that allow
corporate boards to at times implement policies of the sort more
widely favored by communitarians than by contractarians in favor of
workers or other non-shareholder stakeholders that may reduce
shareholder wealth, even over the longer term.
What would be the nature of the fiduciary duties that should be
imposed upon corporate boards under the TPM framework, if any? To
whom should those duties run, and how should director compliance
with those duties be assessed? To these questions I will now turn.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER THE TEAM PRODUCTION
MODEL
A. THE NEW Locus OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Under the TPM, the board of a directors plays a mediating role
among the various corporate stakeholders, subject only to very broad
constraints. One might still technically characterize such a board as
an "agent," although it would be more of an independent contractor-
type agent with very substantial discretion as to how to discharge its
duties than a traditional master-servant corporate agent. Even if a
TPM-style board is regarded as being a species of agent, each of the
stakeholder groups would be entitled to be treated by the board as
"joint principals." For such a multi-principal agency relationship, im-
posing fiduciary duties of care and loyalty that run exclusively to com-
mon shareholders would make no sense at all. If the legal system is to
facilitate TPM-style corporate governance it will therefore be neces-
sary for the courts to either impose upon the board additional and
co-equal fiduciary duties in favor of each of the other stakeholder
groups, redefine the locus of exclusive fiduciary duties as now being
the corporate entity as a whole, or else discard the concept of fiduciary
duties altogether and implement another means of limiting director
discretion. These seem to be the only reasonable choices available.
Corporate law scholars have long debated the merits of supple-
menting the fiduciary duties running to common shareholders with
additional, co-equal fiduciary duties running to other stakeholders,
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such as workers or local communities.38 This debate was energized in
the late 1980s by the passage of a large number of "constituency stat-
utes" in response to the various concerns raised by the increase in the
number of large hostile corporate takeovers. 39 While some partici-
pants in that debate argued in favor of imposing such additional fidu-
ciary duties,4 0 others expressed concerns that corporate directors and
officers would have undue difficulty balancing the conflicting duties,
and that the probable reluctance of courts to second-guess such diffi-
cult decisions might lead to the effective reduction of fiduciary duty
constraints, perhaps to the point of near-elimination, except in cases
of self-dealing. 4
The imposition of additional and competing fiduciary duties
would clearly present major difficulties in assessing compliance, but
such legal changes are fortunately not necessary to facilitate TPM-
style corporate governance. There is no question but that a
TPM-style board of directors that is not guided by the shareholder
primacy norm is going to have to balance in some fashion the interests
of different stakeholder groups where they conflict. However, in many
instances those interests do not conflict, and an exclusive fiduciary
duty in favor of the interests of the entire corporate enterprise is
under those circumstances an appropriate legal directive, regardless
of whether one regards the matter from a contractarian or instead a
communitarian perspective, since it would both reflect the hypotheti-
cal ex ante bargain among the interested parties and not privilege
shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders. Barnes and Stout
in their second TPM article evidence an increasingly clear recognition
of this point.4 2
When, however, corporate decisions must be made on matters
where the interests of different stakeholder groups do diverge, and
where neither the overall welfare of the enterprise nor benefits to the
board itself are at issue, some legal principles beyond the fiduciary
duty to the overall enterprise may be desirable to guide director deci-
38. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales
for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiducialy Duties, 21
STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders
Under State Nonshareholder Consistency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45 (1991);
Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993).
39. By 1993, approximately 30 states had passed statutes permitting but not re-
quiring corporate officials to consider enumerated nonshareholder interests going be-
yond contractual obligations in corporate decisionmaking. Millon, VA. L. REV. at 1375-
76.
40. Van Wezel Stone, 21 STETSON L. REV. at 45; O'Connor, 78 CORNELL L. REV. at
899.
41. Macey, 21 STETSON L. REV. at 23.
42. See Blair and Stout II, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. at 434-38.
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sions. One may favor a legal regime permitting unencumbered "politi-
cal" balancing of interests under such circumstances, as is called for
by Barnes and Stout,43 relying upon the "intrinsic trustworthiness" of
TPM-style boards to impose socially acceptable allocations of the eco-
nomic rents.44 Alternatively, one may conclude, as does David Millon,
that legal deference to such political allocation decisions will simply
validate the much greater extralegal social influence over TPM-style
boards exercised by shareholders compared to other stakeholder con-
stituencies, particularly workers and members of local communities,
thus for better or worse replicating the substantive results of the
shareholder primacy norm.4 5 However, in any event, a framework of
conflicting fiduciary duties is neither an appropriate nor a workable
way for the legal system to attempt to influence such decisions.
I therefore conclude that the fiduciary duty regime that is best
suited for facilitating TPM-style corporate governance is to retain the
concept of exclusive fiduciary duties of loyalty and care owed by the
board of directors, but to respecify their locus as the corporate enter-
prise as a whole rather than the common shareholders. In Part II B of
this article below, I will discuss how such a respecified exclusive fidu-
ciary duty regime can be given operational content. Such a legal re-
gime concededly will not provide legal guidance to directors when
making those allocative decisions among stakeholder groups that do
not affect overall corporate welfare or raise director self-dealing con-
cerns. I recognize that some form of legal constraints on such board
decisions may well be preferable to the naked political resolution of
such questions that Barnes and Stout advocate. However, given the
"trump card" nature of fiduciary duties, it simply will not help the
courts to resolve challenges of such decisions in a consistent and prin-
cipled fashion if they deal out conflicting fiduciary duty trump cards to
all of the players. Some other approach will have to develop to limit
the political character of such decisions if such limitations are deemed
desirable. 46
43. See Blair & Stout I, 85 VA. L. REV. at 250.
44. See Blair and Stout II, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. at 438-43. See also Blair and Stout
III, 149 U. PA. L. REV. at 1735 for an extended discussion of the role played by trust and
confidence in corporate relationships.
45. Millon, 86 VA. L. REV. at 1037-40.
46. As noted above in the text, the question of the appropriate non-fiduciary duty
limitations on the discretion of a TPM-style board of directors is beyond the scope of this
Article.
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
B. ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF DECISIONS FOR FIDUCIARY DUTY
PURPOSES
As a threshold matter, if the fiduciary duties to be applied to
TPM-style board decisions are to be duties of loyalty and care with
regard to the interests of the entire corporate enterprise, it seems
clear that the laws would have to be changed to allow each class of
stakeholders standing to press a derivative suit on behalf of the corpo-
ration to enforce this duty. Otherwise, if standing were more limited,
no one could effectively challenge a board decision that injured the
overall enterprise but furthered the interests of the subset of stake-
holders who had standing to press a derivative claim.
Assuming that all classes of stakeholders are accorded standing
to enforce the fiduciary duties to the overall corporate enterprise, how
would the board's compliance with those duties be assessed if chal-
leged? If the challenge was based upon some form of self-dealing by
the board as a whole, or by some directors acting individually, the ap-
propriate standard would differ little if any from the duty of loyalty
standard currently applied to claims of director self-dealing under the
shareholder primacy norm. If, however, the challenge was based upon
an allegation of injury to the enterprise as a whole that did not involve
director self-dealing, then new criteria by which the impact of a deci-
sion on the overall welfare of the corporate enterprise could be as-
sessed for its consistency with fiduciary duty of care obligations would
have to be applied.
As a conceptual matter, the appropriate criterion here seems to
me readily apparent. The fiduciary duty of care to which TPM-style
boards of public corporations should be subject should be to maximize
the overall value of the corporate entity to all stakeholders, broadly
defined to also include the value of the entity to its (contractual) cus-
tomers and suppliers as well as to those de facto stakeholders (such as
members of local communities) who may not have formal contractual
relationships with the corporation. Such an inclusive specification of
the locus of fiduciary duties of course raises the question whether it is
reasonably amenable to quantification to the extent necessary for it to
be meaningfully applied. Let me attempt to first justify the use of this
very broad criterion as a matter of principle, and then I will discuss
some of the details of its application in order to shed light upon the
feasibility and consequences of its use.
I have argued in some of my earlier work that even under the
conventional agency model of corporate governance, the purely finan-
cial stakeholders in a corporate entity, i.e., the various classes of com-
mon or preferred shareholders and bondholders, not including
employees or members of local communities, would, if rational, not
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agree ex ante among themselves to impose by contract an exclusive
fiduciary duty running solely to the common shareholders. 47 Modern
financial theory is premised upon the insight that such rational inves-
tors would, if transaction costs permit, each be fully diversified in
their holdings of all financial assets-including among their assets
holdings of each of the various classes of financial claims against the
subject corporate entity-in proportion to the relative aggregate mar-
ket value of each class of claims, so as to eliminate the unsystematic
component of their portfolio risk.4 8 Their individual sub-portfolios of
holdings of claims against the subject corporate entity would therefore
not differ among these investors in terms of their relative composition,
but would differ only in their size because of individual wealth differ-
ences and in the extent to which they were leveraged by borrowed
funds because of different investor attitudes towards systematic mar-
ket risk. These investors would therefore not choose to impose by con-
tract a blanket fiduciary duty rule that the board of directors was to
favor the residual shareholder claimants regardless of whether the
consequence was a greater adverse impact on other classes of financial
claimants. Such a rule could work to injure all of those investors.4 9
Each hypothetical investor being fully diversified across all of those
claims, they would all very quickly agree that the board should be con-
tractually placed under a fiduciary duty to instead maximize the over-
all value of all financial claims combined, rather than the value of only
the most residual claims.
This simple hypothetical bargain analysis of the locus and nature
of efficient fiduciary duties among purely financial claimants cannot
be generalized without qualification to the TPM situation here consid-
ered, where all classes of de jure and de facto stakeholders, employees
and members of local communities as well as purely financial claim-
ants, would be involved in the hypothetical ex ante negotiations. This
is because employees and members of local communities, even if "ra-
tional," in general simply do not have the wealth available to enable
them to fully diversify away the high degree of unsystematic risk
brought to their "portfolios" by their employment or otherwise-based
stake in the welfare of the corporate entity. These claims will quite
often be their dominant "asset" despite their attempts to diversify, and
their interests in these hypothetical negotiations would therefore
often diverge to some extent from those of the more fully diversified
purely financial claimants.
47. See Crespi, 55 SMU L. REV. at 141. See also Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient
Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 214 (1999).
48. See Crespi, 55 SMU L. REV. at 149-52.
49. Id. at 151.
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While the financial and non-financial stakeholders would ap-
proach these ex ante negotiations with differing interests, they would
nevertheless all agree that imposing a fiduciary duty upon the board
of directors to maximize the overall combined value of all stakeholder
claims against the corporate entity would be in their collective inter-
est. Put simply, despite their differences as to how the corporation's
economic rent "pie" should be divided, they would all agree that the
board of directors should be subjected first and foremost to an overrid-
ing fiduciary duty obligation to make the pie as large as possible, con-
sistent with the honoring of all corporate contractual commitments.
There are of course some formidable measurement problems in-
herent in determining whether a board decision has truly maximized
the aggregate value of the corporate entity to all stakeholders, as com-
pared to the consequences of the other available course of action (in-
cluding the "no action" null option). Conceptually, one would ideally
like to be able to do a "before" and "after" comparison of the total ag-
gregate value of the corporate entity to all stakeholders to determine
the net impact of the decision at issue and then assess whether that
net impact was the most favorable to the entity of the set of potential
before/after net impacts that would have resulted from each of the
competing options (including the "no action" option) from which the
board of directors made its choice.
While the impact of a decision upon the value of purely financial
claims such as shares of stock or bonds can often be determined from
the changes in the market prices for those claims, 50 the valuation of
the impacts upon employee or local community wealth will usually in-
volve much more tentative and subjective assessments. For example,
determining the net impact of a corporate decision upon the aggregate
value of a corporate entity to its employees would involve first of all
determining as the pre-decision value baseline the following figure:
the present value of the combined expected stream of salary payments
to each of those employees over their projected future careers with the
firm,5 1 plus the present value of the combined expected stream of non-
economic satisfactions provided to each of those employees by their
employment over and above their financial compensation, minus the
present value of the combined stream of "disutilities" imposed upon
each employee by having to do the work necessary to satisfy their em-
50. Market price measures of the impacts of the competing options not chosen by
the board of directors would of course not exist, and those "road not chosen" hypotheti-
cal, counterfactual impacts would be far more difficult to estimate.
51. As a matter of principle the present value of the expected future stream of pay-
ments to future employees of the firm should also be included, although, as a practical
matter, it is likely to be impossible to establish the identity or timing or length of tenure
of those future employees.
[Vol. 36636
2003] FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 637
ployment obligations. 52 When calculating the value of purely finan-
cial claims against the corporate entity, one can to a first
approximation reasonably assume that there are no significant bene-
fits provided to those claimants in excess of the market value of their
claims, and that there are no significant disutilities involved in hold-
ing those claims. These assumptions of course would each be most
unreasonable with regard to employee claims, and even though this
comprehensive calculation concerning the value of the corporation to
its employees may prove quite difficult,5 3 it is a necessary aspect of an
overall fiduciary duty compliance assessment.
Once the pre-decision baseline net present value to employees has
been calculated, the same algorithim would have to be applied to cal-
culate the post-decision present value of the corporate entity to its em-
ployees, 54 as well as the post-decision present value of the corporate
entity to the employees had any one of the other competing options
under consideration been adopted instead. These calculations may be
far more complex than the previous baseline calculation. For exam-
ple, if any employees are terminated (or have their salaries and/or
work responsibilities reduced) as a result of the decision (or would
have been as a result of any of the other options being compared), it
will be necessary to consider as an offset to their losses of salary due to
their termination (or salary/responsibility reduction) the present
value of any salary payments or other satisfactions that they will ob-
tain, net of any new "disutilities" imposed, in the employment alterna-
tives they have (or would) pursue. If any new employees are hired (or
old employees promoted) as a result of the decision (or would be under
one of the alternatives being considered), their net gains should be
included in the post-decision aggregate corporate value, and to be
properly calculated one must subtract from their net corporate bene-
fits the net rewards they were previously obtaining from their former
occupations.
From a contractarian perspective one should also consider the net
impacts upon the employees of other firms whose employment situa-
tions are affected in some indirect fashion by the movement of employ-
ees to and from the subject corporation, since they too would
presumably have participated in and offered appropriate "bribes" of
up to a certain size to protect their interests in the hypothetical initial
52. This latter adjustment obviously will sharply reduce the net present value of
the corporate entity to its employees!
53. And, of course, the estimation of the hypothetical impacts upon employees of
the policy options not chosen would prove even more difficult.
54. Id.
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Coasian negotiations establishing the corporate entity,5 5 and would
thereby have contracted to be included among the fiduciary duty re-
cipients. Communitarians would of course also call for their inclusion,
although basing this upon the different premise of the importance of
worker interests generally to community welfare. As a practical mat-
ter, however, this second-order impact (and subsequent third- and
higher-order general equilibrium impacts) on employee welfare else-
where in the economy is likely to be impossible to assess with any
meaningful degree of precision.
With regard to the impacts of corporate decisions upon the mem-
bers of the local community (or multiple communities) in which the
corporation is situated, even where there is no formal contractual rela-
tionship between the corporation and the members of the community
it is appropriate from either the contractarian or the communitarian
perspective to also consider those impacts in the fiduciary duty assess-
ment. Such local communities should be broadly defined to include all
persons outside of the corporation's shareholder/bondholder/employee
groups who nevertheless are de facto stakeholders in that corporate
decisions may have significant implications for their welfare. The rel-
evant members of such local communities would include the corpora-
tion's customers and suppliers, and those persons who are more
indirectly impacted through their relationships with those customers
and suppliers, as well as any other persons who for reasons of geo-
graphical proximity or otherwise are indirectly affected by corporate
actions.
The rationale for this broad inclusion of de facto stakeholder
groups under the fiduciary duty umbrella is clear. To contractarians,
once again, the members of such local communities should count as de
facto stakeholders because they would presumably also have partici-
pated in the hypothetical ex ante Coasian negotiations establishing
the contours of contractual rights through their willingness to offer
"bribes" of up to a certain size to the other stakeholders if necessary to
obtain benefits or avoid costs. To communitarians, in contrast, the
right of members of local communities in which the corporate entity is
situated to have their interests considered is almost an article of faith
not in need of intellectual justification. Either way, the impact upon
members of the local community is a clearly relevant concern for the
fiduciary duty compliance assessment.
When attempting to value the impacts of corporate decisions upon
local community-type stakeholders based on the perceived "external"
benefits conferred (or costs imposed) upon the community by the cor-
55. I offer here the obligatory citation. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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poration, however, even greater measurement problems are presented
than by the difficult assessments discussed above that are necessary
to measure the impacts upon employees. One must once again first
determine the pre-decision baseline value of the corporate entity to
the local community. To do this, one must determine the present
value of the steam of expected community benefits (not including any
employment benefits to corporate employees, which have already been
counted), and then subtract the present value of any costs the corpora-
tion imposes on the community, such as "external" costs, tax subsi-
dies, etc. 56 One must then calculate this figure post-decision, as well
as for the hypothetical post-decision situations had any of the other
available options been chosen, and then compare the net impacts upon
the community for each possible alternative. If the result of the deci-
sion (or any of the rejected alternatives) impacts any communities, ei-
ther by increasing or reducing the corporate entity's employment
presence or otherwise, the net impacts of these effects must be in-
cluded. These community impacts in general are likely to be even
more difficult to estimate than are the prior employee impact calcula-
tions because there are unlikely to be any useful "market" figures
available to assist at all in making these calculations.
The final and most straightforward calculation that would be re-
quired would be to aggregate the net impact upon all stakeholder
groups combined of each option that was considered, and then com-
pare these net impacts to one another to see whether the course of
action chosen provides the largest possible net benefit to the overall
corporate entity. If the course of action with the largest net benefit is
in fact the option the corporation did pursue, then its board has satis-
fied the fiduciary duty of care requirement. If one of the other options
considered would have had a greater net benefit, then the board has
violated its fiduciary duty to the corporate entity as a whole. It must
be kept in mind that the fiduciary duty requirement should be deemed
satisified so long as the overall combined impact on the corporate en-
tity of the decision is the most favorable possible, even if one or more
of the stakeholder groups are injured by the decision made. In more
technical terms, it should not be necessary that the decision results in
a Pareto-improvement with regard to the each of the different stake-
holder classes, so long as it results in the largest Kaldor-Hicks im-
provement possible among the set of options that were considered. 57
56. Once again, this difficult measurement exercise will also have to be conducted
for each of the policy alternatives that was not chosen by the board of directors.
57. For a discussion of the Pareto-improvement and Kaldor-Hicks-improvement
criteria, see Gregory Scott Crespi, The Midlife Crisis of the Law and Economics Move-
ment: Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 231, 234-37 (1991).
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C. THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW Locus OF FIDUCIARY
DUTIES
In assessing the potential significance of respecifying fiduciary
duties to run to the corporate entity as a whole, broadly defined, one
must keep in mind the practical significance of the existing fiduciary
duty regime. The courts have universally applied the very deferential
business judgment rule when compliance with the fiduciary duty of
care is at issue.58 Under the business judgment rule jurisprudence
courts will generally limit their inquiry to whether the board has ac-
ted in good faith and on a reasonably informed basis in making the
decision at issue, with the initial presumption being in favor of the
board, and unless it is demonstrated that these procedural require-
ments are not met the courts will usually not question the merits of
the decision. Furthermore, under the law of most state jurisdictions,
corporations can adopt charter provisions that shield their directors
from financial liability for violations of the duty of care. 59 As a practi-
cal matter, therefore, the existing fiduciary duty of care standard pro-
vides directors only with an aspirational norm, an exhoratory
statement of good practice, rather than subjecting them to an enforce-
able legal duty.
A respecified fiduciary duty of care running to the entire corpo-
rate enterprise would almost certainly be implemented by the courts
with at least the same degree of deference to board decisions as is cur-
rently exhibited. A procedure-oriented business judgment rule review
would again be substituted for consideration of the merits of the deci-
sion at issue. I am convinced of this because as I have demonstrated
above the calculations required to assess whether a decision satisfies
this respecified fiduciary duty are easily an order of magnitude more
complex and subjective than are those calculations that are required
to determine only whether a decision maximizes the value of a corpo-
ration's common shares. Even a judge who was willing to strictly
scrutinize the consequences of the decision at issue on common share
values relative to the hypothetical impacts that the other options con-
sidered might have had would be more reluctant to second-guess the
much more complex assessments of the relative combined impacts on
bondholders, employees, and local community de facto stakeholders of
the options considered. It seems reasonable to predict that since the
assessment required would be much more difficult, the standard of
58. "[Als a practical matter, a negligent director is more likely to be hit by light-
ning after leaving her board meeting then she is to pay damages." Blair and Stout III,
149 U. PA. L. REV. at 1791.
59. See, e.g., D.G.C.L. § 102(b)(7) (1999).
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review is likely to be even more deferential and procedural in charac-
ter than at present.
The application of this respecified fiduciary duty of care would
therefore in practice almost certainly be limited primarily to a busi-
ness judgment rule assessment of the procedures that had been fol-
lowed. This assessment would, however, probably be a somewhat
more extensive inquiry than is done at present since under the new
fiduciary duty standard for a decision to be "reasonably informed" the
board would likely be required to show that they had considered infor-
mation relevant to assessing the magnitude of the relative impacts of
their choices on all affected stakeholders and not the common share-
holders alone. One would also expect the state legislatures to again
quickly respond to this respecified fiduciary duty, as they did after
Smith v. Van Gorkom60 with amendments to their statutory opt-in
provisions that were based on Delaware General Corporate Laws sec-
tion 102(b)(7), that would allow firms to shield their directors from
liability for violations of this broader fiduciary duty as well.
What this all would mean, in practice, is that the new fiduciary
duty would resemble in significant regards the earlier exclusive fiduci-
ary duty to shareholders in that it would largely play the role of an
aspirational norm rather than an enforceable legal directive. How-
ever, one should not minimize the importance of aspirational norms in
shaping the behavior of corporate directors. 6 1 Norms do matter, and I
hope that I have made clear in this article that it would probably lead
to more efficient resource utilization if those boards of directors that
are engaged in TPM-style governance of public corporations were en-
couraged by the courts to aspire to maximize the value of the overall
corporate entity rather than to attempt to maximize the value of the
corporation's common shares.
IV. CONCLUSION
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout's TPM of corporate governance is
an interesting and promising framework that merits even more schol-
60. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
61. Blair and Stout III, 149 U. PA. L. REV. at 1744, which states:
By articulating a social expectation that directors will exercise due care, judi-
cial opinions on the duty of care may influence directors' behavior not so much
by changing their external incentives as by changing their internal prefer-
ences. This approach explains the schizophrenic quality of modern case law on
the duty of care, which generally exhorts directors to meet a high standard of
behavior while simultaneously declining to impose liability for failing to meet
that standard.
Id. (citations omitted). See also id. at 1787 which states, "[Tirust-based analysis sug-
gests that the central purpose of fiduciary duty law is to induce trust behavior ... the
law expects the fiduciary to internalize commitment . .. ."
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arly attention and criticism than the substantial amount it has so far
received. Their basic argument is that the TPM has been widely
adopted by public corporations because it better accomodates their
governance needs than does the conventional agency model with its
associated shareholder primacy norm, and that it has been and indeed
should be embraced by the courts as the paradigmatic form of govern-
ance of public corporations. In this article I have attempted to show
that if the courts in fact do come to embrace the TPM as the dominant
form of corporate governance they should in principle also respecify
the locus of the fiduciary duties of these boards of directors to run to
the corporate entity as a whole, broadly defined, rather than exclu-
sively to the corporation's common shareholders.
The determination of whether a board has met this respecified
duty of care to the entire corporate entity, however, proves to be a very
complex calculation requiring difficult and subjective assessments of
the impacts of the decision at issue, as compared to the probable con-
sequences of the other options that were considered, on shareholders,
bondholders, employees, and the de jure and de factor stakeholder
members of the "local communities" in which the corporation is situ-
ated, including its customers, suppliers, local residents and other per-
sons indirectly affected. The difficulties and uncertainty inherent in
such a complex determination would likely lead courts to continue to
apply a deferential and procedure-oriented business judgment rule as-
sessment rather than attempt to scrutinize the merits of the decision.
The respecified fiduciary duties that are most consistent with the
TPM corporate governance framework would therefore resemble the
existing fiduciary duties in one significant regard in that they would
continue to provide in practice only an aspirational norm rather than
an enforceable substantive legal standard. However, since aspira-
tional norms do have some influence on behavior, if the TPM in fact
becomes the dominant corporate governance paradigm then the
respecification of the locus of fiduciary duties to run to the corporation
as a whole is likely to lead to at least modest efficiency gains in corpo-
rate policies.
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